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Does Equity Analyst Research Lack Rigor and Objectivity? Evidence From 
Conference Call Questions and Research Notes 
 
Abstract 
Research questions the rigor and objectivity of analysts’ research due to the institutional 
structures in which they operate (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005 Accounting, Organisations and 
Society). However, insights from psychology highlight the need to condition this conclusion on 
the incentives for attributional search. Based on social cognition theory, we test whether the 
degree of diligence and criticality evident in analyst research is higher (lower) for negative (non-
negative) schema-discrepant events. We evaluate this prediction against the null hypothesis that 
analyst research consistently lacks rigor and objectivity. We use earnings surprises as our 
schema-discrepant conditioning event, and examine the content of analysts’ conference call 
questions and research notes to assess the properties of their research. We find that levels of rigor 
and objectivity are statistically and economically higher for research conducted in response to 
negative earnings surprises. Findings are consistent with analysts’ innate cognitive processing 
response counteracting institutional considerations when attributional search incentives are 
strong. Results also reveal non-trivial levels of rigor and objectivity in response to non-negative 
schema-discrepant earnings news. Differences in the properties of analysts’ work are also 





Does Equity Analyst Research Lack Rigor and Objectivity? Evidence From 
Conference Call Questions and Research Notes 
“[Dean’s] strategy has not worked… If the strategy does work, it will require expensive 
investments by Dean to get there with scarce visibility of how the savings drop to the bottom line.”  
(Credit Suisse research note on Dean Foods Company, 30.09.2010) 
 “… to say you are on track really, kind of I think, is not really accurate.”  
(Analyst question at conference call for H. J. Heinz Company, 02.25.2005) 
Introduction 
The value of sell-side equity analyst research is a source of ongoing debate among 
academics, investment professionals, regulators, and the financial media. On the one hand, 
studies consistently demonstrate that analysts’ earnings forecasts, target prices, investment 
recommendations, and narrative commentaries contain information for investors (Lys and Sohn, 
1990; Bradshaw, 2002; Asquith et al., 2005; De Franco and Hope, 2009; Huang et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, a large body of evidence suggests that the social context in which analysts operate 
renders their research biased, incomplete, excessively dependent on management, reliant on the 
past repeating itself, and lacking in scientific method (Abarbenall and Bernard, 1992; Fogarty 
and Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). 
 Fogarty and Rogers (2005) conjecture that rather than reflecting a neutral and stable 
expertise that is unaffected by social context, analysts’ work is more accurately characterized by 
an institutionalized structure where their independence is compromised by financial conflicts of 
interest and excessive reliance on management as a source of firm-specific information, and 
where as a consequence symbolic displays substitute for rigorous scientific analysis. Consistent 
with an institutional theory interpretation, Fogarty and Rogers (2005) find that analysts’ 




clues to predicting the future. Asquith et al. (2005) and Huang et al. (2012) confirm that the 
average analyst report contains little negative commentary about firms or management. Further, 
Kothari et al. (2009) find no significant association between the content of analysts’ published 
research and firms cost of capital, which they attribute to credibility and timeliness problems 
with sell-side research. Collectively, these findings echo doubts expressed by the media, 
investment professionals, and regulators over the rigor and objectivity of analysts’ work.1  
Using insights from psychology that stress the conditional nature of individuals’ 
attributional search processes (e.g., Lau and Russell, 1980) we revisit the view that analyst 
research lacks rigor and independence. In particular, social cognition theory demonstrates that 
schema-consistent and positive schema-discrepant events tend to elicit low levels of penetrating, 
objective analysis due to their confirmatory nature. Detailed and critical attributional search 
behavior is more typically reserved for negative schema-discrepant outcomes that challenge 
individuals’ expectations and existing knowledge structures (Wong and Weiner, 1981). Despite 
robust evidence regarding the conditional nature of attributional search, studies examining the 
properties of analyst commentaries typically adopt a random sampling approach designed to 
maximize generalizeability (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 
2009; Huang et al., 2012). However, since a high fraction of analyst research is released in 
response to either good news or no material new information (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005, Table 1), 
failure to condition on the incentives for attributional search can tilt the evidence in favor of 
observing bland, management-friendly research that lacks scientific rigor. 
                                                 
1
 For example, Financial Times, “Shoot All the Analysts”, March 20, 2001, page 22; Wall Street Journal, “Outlook 
for Analysts: Skepticism and Blame”, June 13, 2001; Financial Times, “Titans who were brought to book”, March 
11, 2008; Financial Times, “Investment research fights to prove its worth”, March 19, 2009; Financial Times, “Sell-




We test whether the properties of analyst research vary with the incentives for 
attributional search as predicted by social cognition theory, with evidence of thorough, critical 
financial analysis being more apparent for negative schema-discrepant events (i.e., unexpected 
bad news). This conjecture is compared against the null hypothesis from institutional theory that 
analyst research is consistently bland, management-friendly, and largely symbolic (Fogarty and 
Rogers, 2005). Quarterly earnings announcements serve as our conditioning variable for 
attributional search behavior. Valuation theory provides the basis for our measures of rigorous 
financial analysis. Specifically, news affects the market’s assessment of value through revisions 
in either expected future cash flows or discount rates. We therefore test whether analysts probe 
firms’ performance prospects (i.e., cash flow expectations) more thoroughly and demonstrate 
more uncertainty (i.e., discount rate expectations) after negative earnings surprises. We also 
examine analyst objectivity as measured by their propensity to criticize management, with more 
frequent and direct challenges expected after negative earnings news.  
We measure rigorous and objective financial analysis in response to quarterly earnings 
surprises by applying a combination of manual content analysis and natural language processing 
methods to observable elements of analysts’ work. In a significant departure from prior research 
using random samples of published reports to measure the properties of analysts’ work, we 
assess their behavior using a combination of research notes published within three days of the 
quarterly earnings announcement and questions posed during the question and answer (Q&A) 
segment of the corresponding conference call. Several factors motivate this combined approach. 
First, insofar as research notes (conference call questions) are more representative of information 
dissemination (information acquisition) activities, examining both aspects affords a more 




speech versus text) can affect the observable features of attributional search (Biber, 1986; Linell, 
2005: 17-23). In particular, conference call Q&As involve more natural, improvised use of 
language compared with prepared commentaries (Frankel et al., 1999; Price et al., 2012; Chen et 
al., 2013a), and as such may yield incremental insights concerning rigor and objectivity. 
Empirical tests are conducted using a sample of quarterly earnings announcements made 
by large U.S. firms during the period 2004-2012. We control for firm characteristics and 
operating seasonality that may influence analyst research (Johnson and Zhao, 2011; Stickel, 
1989) using a within-subject design that compares the properties of analyst research notes and 
conference call questions across negative and non-negative earnings surprises for the same firm-
quarter in adjacent years. Results reveal statistically and economically higher levels of rigor and 
objectivity in response to negative earnings surprises. For example, the fraction of conference 
call questions probing forward-looking weaknesses and threats (challenging management) 
increases by 25 (51) percent following negative earnings news. Similarly, the proportion of 
negatively-toned outlook (management-related) categories in analyst research notes increases by 
more than 200 (400) percent following a negative surprise. These findings support the view that 
analysts engage in logical, independent research in circumstances conducive to attributional 
search. We also find evidence of statistically higher levels of uncertainty following negative 
earnings news, although results are confined to conference call questions and the economic 
significance of the effect is more marginal. While non-negative earnings surprises are associated 
with lower levels rigor and objectivity, the level of critical analysis is nevertheless material in 
absolute terms. For example, 16 (nine) percent of conference call questions raise concern about 
prospects (challenge management) even when earnings meet or beat expectations, while 15 




after a non-negative surprise. Collectively, the evidence is inconsistent with the view that 
analysts’ work is consistently bland and uncritical due to the social context in which they 
operate. Results instead suggest that analysts’ innate cognitive processing response overrides 
institutional considerations when attributional search incentives are strong. 
Supplementary evidence suggests that insights regarding the properties of analysts’ work 
may vary with the type of research examined. On the one hand, challenges to management 
appear more direct in a conference call environment whereas written research tends to contain 
more measured criticism. Analyst propensity to criticize management in the absence of bad news 
is also more evident for conference calls. On the other hand, while the sensitivity of analysts’ 
cognitive processing behavior to bad news (relative to good news) is statistically and 
economically significant for both modalities, the effect is more pronounced for written research. 
Our analysis contributes to extant research in several ways. First, we extend Fogarty and 
Rogers (2005) by demonstrating that while analyst behavior is almost certainly conditioned by 
social context, it also displays features that are entirely consistent with normal attributional 
search processes. Whereas analysts’ work may appear anodyne in schema-consistent settings, 
they nevertheless respond with more penetrating research when actual performance deviates 
from expectations generally and in particular when performance is worse than predicted. Second, 
we contribute to a growing body of research on earnings conference calls, the majority of which 
tests for incremental information content (Frankel et al., 1999; Bowen et al., 2002; Kimbrough, 
2005; Maydew and Venkatachalam, 2012). Several studies examine the information content of 
the Q&A section of the conference call without distinguishing between manager and analyst 
content (Matsumoto et al., 2011; Price et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013a). Only Schoenfeld (2012) 




Schoenfeld (2012) and Chen et al. (2013b) who focus on aggregate question tone to measure 
predictive information content and belief revisions, respectively, we examine question-level 
content with the aim of shedding new light on analysts’ information acquisition behavior.2 Our 
analysis therefore speaks to calls for more work examining what analysts actually do (Bradshaw, 
2011; Schipper, 1991). Third, ours is the first study of which we are aware to compare the 
properties of analysts’ spoken and written outputs. Findings suggest that conclusions regarding 
their behavior may depend on the format (i.e., speech versus text) and aims (i.e., information 
acquisition versus information dissemination) of the specific research outputs examined.  
 
Background, motivation and predictions 
Prior research 
 The quality and independence of sell-side analyst research has attracted significant 
attention from a range of financial market stakeholders. At the heart of the debate lies concern 
that the social and financial arrangements contextualizing analysts’ work lead to a decoupling 
between the fundamental characteristics of rigorous, independent financial analysis and the 
actual properties of their work (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). Factors predicted to compromise 
independence and promote decoupling include analysts’ desire to curry favor with management 
on whom they rely for firm-specific information (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Libby et al., 2008; 
Chen and Matsumoto, 2006), and incentives from their employer to increase investment banking 
business (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al., 2000) and maximize trading commissions 
(Cowan et al., 2006). Motivated by these concerns, analyst research has been the subject of 
significant financial media scrutiny and regulatory intervention over the last decade. 
                                                 
2
 Matsumoto et al. (2011) examine conference call transcripts and find the Q&A segment is more informative when 
performance is poor. However, because their tests aggregate analysts’ questions with managers’ responses, it is 
unclear whether this result is due to analysts seeking out more information or management voluntarily disclosing 




 Extensive research on the properties of analysts’ work yields mixed and inconclusive 
findings. Summary output measures in the form of earnings forecasts, price targets, and 
investment recommendations contain information for market participants, consistent with 
analysts undertaking meaningful financial analysis rather than simply rebroadcasting existing 
information (Bradshaw, 2011). The narrative content of research reports is also incrementally 
informative (Asquith et al., 2005; De Franco and Hope, 2011; Huang et al., 2012). On the other 
hand, research highlights a number of concerns over the quality of their work. First, the 
economic magnitude of analyst superiority over other forecasting methods appears small 
(Bradshaw, 2011), consistent with an over-reliance on the past repeating itself (Fogarty and 
Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). Second, analyst forecasts fail to fully and rationally 
incorporate publicly available information contained in stock prices (Lys and Sohn, 1990; 
Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992), current-period accruals (Bradshaw et al., 2001), and accounting 
conservatism (Louis et al., 2010). Third, analysts display evidence of positive bias toward firms 
and management: earnings forecasts tend to be optimistic (e.g., O’Brien, 1988), hold and sell 
recommendations are relatively scarce (e.g., Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2006), explicit 
negative commentary is rare (Asquith et al., 2005; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005), and firms 
experiencing weak prior performance are associated with the most optimistic earnings forecasts 
(Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Ali et al., 1992). Finally, Kothari et al. (2009) conclude that 
analyst reports contain little information about risk and uncertainty. Collectively, these findings 
cast a cloud over the rigor and objectivity of analysts’ work.  
 
The contingent nature of cognitive reasoning 
Social cognition research in the form of attribution theory highlights the circumstances 




indicates the attribution process is asymmetric with respect to expectations in two ways. First, 
schema-discrepant events are more likely than expectation-consistent outcomes to elicit causal 
search because unexpected outcomes cannot be assimilated in individuals’ existing knowledge 
structures (Lau and Russell, 1980; Bohner et al., 1988; Ditto and Lopez, 1992). Second, negative 
schema-discrepant news is more likely than positive schema-discrepant news to trigger cognitive 
analysis (Wong and Weiner, 1981; Psyzczynski and Greenberg, 1981). 
While social cognition theory highlights the conditional nature of attributional search 
processes, studies examining analyst commentaries often use random or comprehensive 
sampling techniques that bias against negative schema-discrepant events for several reasons. 
First, a large fraction of analysts’ published research summarizes and interprets existing 
information in the context of their prevailing investment recommendation. For example, 65% 
(47%) of research reports studied by Asquith et al. (2005) are reiterations (independent of other 
news). Second, quarterly earnings announcements are the most common news event causing 
analysts to issue new research (Asquith et al., 2005) but in the majority of cases earnings news is 
non-negative (Brown and Caylor, 2005). Third, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) predict and find 
that analysts are more likely to issue research on firms for which they hold favorable beliefs. 
Insofar as samples of analyst research examined in prior studies are titled toward schema-
consistent or positive schema-discrepant contexts, attribution theory predicts a tendency toward 
observing bland, non-confrontational content due to weak incentives for causal search. Analyst-
level cognitive reasoning processes therefore serve to reinforce the effect of social context on the 
observable properties of their work.  
Negative schema-discrepant corporate outcomes provide a setting where analysts’ 




predicts analysts’ research activities are more likely characterized by causal search processes 
resembling objective scientific enquiry when corporate outcomes fall below expectations. We 
use the sign of the quarterly earnings surprise to differentiate between negative and non-negative 
schema-discrepant events and then compare the characteristics of analysts’ work across the two 
partitions. Attribution theory predicts that evidence of rigorous and objective research will be 
more apparent in response to negative earnings surprises.
3
 Alternatively, if the social context in 
which financial analysis is conducted creates an overwhelming institutionalized structure 
favoring consistently bland, management-friendly analysis that relies heavily on the past 
repeating itself, then one should expect to observe similar low levels of rigorous, objective 
analysis across positive and negative surprise partitions.  
 
Operational constructs 
We look to valuation theory for guidance on the properties of rigorous financial analysis. 
Valuation theory pinpoints two channels through which news can affect the market’s assessment 
of value. One route is via revision in expected future cash flows. All else equal, negative 
earnings surprises (NES) can lead to downward revision in expected cash flows as investors 
extrapolate disappointing short-term earnings performance to previously unknown and 
potentially persistent operating problems. Regular attributional search aimed at unpicking the 
consequences of NES for shareholder value is therefore expected to reflect heightened concern 
about an entity’s prospects, business model, and strategic direction compared with schema-
consistent or positive schema-discrepant outcomes. Accordingly, rigorous financial analysis in 
                                                 
3
 Although studies show that analysts revise key summary outputs in response to earnings surprises (Abarbanell and 
Bernard, 1992; Yezegel, 2012), this evidence does not speak directly to our research question for several reasons. 
First, revisions in summary outputs may be driven by factors other than attributional search behaviour (Altinkilic 
and Hansen, 2009). Second, summary outputs such as earnings forecasts and investment recommendations yield 




response to NES is expected to demonstrate relatively less acceptance that past performance is 
relevant for predicting future earnings and more concern about performance prospects. On the 
other hand, if analysts’ natural cognitive reasoning is constrained by institutional structures then 
their opinion of performance prospects post-NES will be indistinguishable from schema-
consistent or positive schema-discrepant earnings surprises.
4
  
The second route through which unfavorable news affects value is via upward revision in 
discount rate expectations due an increase in perceived uncertainty (Brown et al., 2009). Three 
streams of research support this link (Kothari et al., 2009). First, unfavorable news is expected to 
increase cash flow risk and hence the discount rate, even when the news does not contain direct 
information on the risk of those cash flows. Second, Ng et al. (2009) argue that unfavorable news 
predicts higher volatility in future earnings. The increase in uncertainty resulting from higher 
earnings volatility raises the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spread and hence the 
cost of trading the security (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). Third, 
the leverage effect also predicts a negative association between news content and cost of capital 
(Galai and Masulis, 1976; Ball and Kothari, 1989). Based on the view that unfavorable news 
triggers upward revision in discount rates due to increased uncertainty, rigorous financial 
investigation by analysts in response to NES should be characterized by higher levels of 
uncertainty due to enhanced attributional search. Conversely, if analysts fail to respond as theory 
predicts due to the social context in which they operate then their research outputs post-NES will 
reflect uncertainty levels similar to when firms report favorable earnings news. 
Analyst objectivity toward management is the second dimension of their work on which 
we seek evidence. Research suggests that NES reduce the perception of management ability 
                                                 
4
 Analysts may view unexpectedly favorable earnings with particular scepticism, leading to higher levels of 
attributional search aimed at determining if reported results are persistence. This effect will act against our 




among market participants (Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Mergenthaler et al., 2008, Graham et al., 
2005; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; DeFond and Park, 1999).
5
 If analysts engage in dispassionate 
research then enhanced cognitive reasoning post-NES is expected to result in an increased 
willingness to challenge or criticize management. Conversely, if institutional pressure to 
cultivate and maintain relationships with management renders critical, objective analysis 
unfeasible then analysts’ stance toward management will be uniformly non-negative regardless 
of the sign of the earnings surprise. 
 
Unit of analysis  
Studies examining the narrative aspects of analysts’ work focus mainly on published 
research reports (Previts et al., 1994; Asquith et al., 2005; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Kothari et 
al., 2009; De Franco and Hope, 2011; Huang et al., 2012). Although reports provide an important 
and visible lens through which to study analyst research, they nevertheless represent only one 
aspect of their work. Several factors suggest that published reports may provide an incomplete 
lens through which to study analyst behavior. First, analysts engage in both information 
gathering and information dissemination activities. Whereas rigorous cross-examination of 
management is more likely to occur in the information gathering dimension of their role, 
published research reports are concerned primarily with information dissemination and as such 
are likely to display more judicious, less confrontational content. Second, the marketing role of 
reports renders them particularly prone to the behavior documented by Fogarty and Rogers 
(2005). More generally, research in corpus linguistics identifies systematic differences in the 
properties of written and spoken language due to factors such as permanence (writing is more 
                                                 
5
 A decline in management’s reputation and perceived competence among outsiders may also threaten firm value 
through a higher cost of capital resulting from increased information risk (Barton and Mercer, 2005). We view this 




permanent than speech) and spontaneity (speech is more spontaneous and less constrained 
whereas written language is more refined, measured, anonymous, etc.) (Biber, 1986; Chafe and 
Tannen, 1987; Linell, 2005). Analysts’ direct, spontaneous interactions with management may 
therefore trigger more debate and reveal greater tensions among parties (Chen et al. 2013a). 
Motivated by the possibility that direct analyst-manager interaction geared toward 
information acquisition may yield incremental evidence on analyst behavior, we extend our 
focus beyond research reports to include a key information gathering activity. Specifically, we 
examine both written output in the form of research notes published within three days of a 
quarterly earnings announcement and the questions posed to management by analysts during the 
Q&A segment of the corresponding quarterly earnings conference call. Whether the relative 
importance of attributional search behavior versus the sociology of financial analysis differs 
across these two modalities is an open empirical question.  
  
Research design 
Earnings surprises and within-subject matching procedure 
 Tests focus on analyst responses to quarterly earnings surprises, defined as the difference 
between reported earnings and the market expectation of earnings: 
iqtiqtiqt EFEES  ,       (1) 
where ES is the earnings surprise for firm i in quarter q of fiscal year t, E is quarter q’s 
unadjusted IBES actual earnings for firm i, and EF is the last unadjusted IBES consensus 
earnings forecast for q prior to the earnings announcement. Negative earnings surprises (NES) 




We test for differences in analyst behavior conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise 
using the firm as its own control. Specifically, we match a negative surprise announced by firm i 
in quarter q of fiscal year t with a corresponding MBE announced by the same firm for the same 
quarter in fiscal year t-1. Matching by firm controls for factors such as sector, firm size, business 
strategy, management team, and accounting methods that shape analysts’ research (Johnson and 
Zhao, 2011), while matching by quarter controls for operating seasonality and variation in 
analysts response to earnings news (Stickel, 1989).  
Conference call transcripts for each earnings announcement are obtained from Investext 
and company websites. Research notes issued within three days of the corresponding earnings 
announcement are also obtained from Investext. Since firms are tracked by multiple analysts, we 
select four reports for each NES and MBE announcement, respectively. Analysing multiple 
reports reduces the risk of analysts with extreme views or conflicted interests skewing our 
findings and also controls for variation in analyst quality (Hugon and Muslu, 2010). For 
announcements where more than four research notes are available, priority is given to analysts in 
Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American Research Team to capture brokers whose views 
are considered more influential and reliable (Asquith et al., 2005).  
 
Empirical proxies and content analysis methods: conference call questions 
We examine all equity analyst questions in the Q&A segment of the call for the q
th
 
quarterly earnings announcement. Question text is extract manually and organised by analyst 
into question blocks. A question block comprises one or more questions posed by analyst j on the 
same topic. A combination of manual and automated content analysis procedures is then used to 




management. Test variables for the q
th
 earnings announcement are defined as the fraction of total 
question blocks relating to the k
th
 conference call construct: 
CC_Constructkj = 
blocks question of number Total
construct k the for coded blocks question of Number th
  (2) 










 is coded using a manual procedure where each question block is 
classified along the following dimensions: (a) forward-looking, (b) current-period or backward-
looking, (c) strengthens and opportunities (SO) facing the entity, and (d) weaknesses and threats 
(WT) facing the entity.
6
 Examples of SO include margin improvement, cost reduction, brand 
power, supply chain efficiency, new markets, and planned investments and acquisitions. 
Examples of WT include margin deterioration, cost inflation, capacity constraints, supply 
problems, competitive pressure, macroeconomic slowdown, and management turnover. The 
coding procedure is non-mutually exclusive such that a given question block may be coded 
simultaneously as forward-and backward-looking, and relating to both SO and WT. Where 
reference is made to SO or WT, we also classify the tenor of the discussion as positive, neutral or 
negative. For example, a question block expressing concern about capacity constraints is coded 
negative WT; a question block exploring whether any capacity constraints exist is coded neutral 
WT; and a question block speculating on possible improvement in capacity constraints is coded 
positive WT. We favor manual coding over automated content analysis for PROSP_NEG
CC
 
because identifying SO and WT, together with the tenor of the discussion, is highly context-
specific and sometimes involves reviewing management responses and the presentation section 
                                                 
6
 Negative prospects are distinct from negative tone studied by Chen et al. (2013b) and Schoenfeld (2012). Tone 




of the call. We create an indicator variable equal to one for question blocks with forward-looking 
statements containing negative or neutral discussions of WT, and zero otherwise. From equation 
(2), PROSP_NEG
CC
 is the number of question blocks where this indicator variable equals one 
scaled by the total number question blocks. Two members of the research team coded 30 
transcripts independently to assess the objectivity and replicability of the coding method. Inter-
coder concordance by question ranged from a low of 0.78 to a high of 1.00. 
From a valuation perspective, greater uncertainty leads to higher discount rates and lower 
firm value. Accordingly, UNCERT
CC
 focuses on language demonstrating surprise, confusion, or 
concern about performance (past, contemporaneous or expected), competitive environment, 
general market conditions, strategy and business model, and management decisions. Attempts to 
devise a reliable and replicable manual method to code uncertainty in analyst questions proved 
difficult because most questions imply a degree of doubt or ambiguity by their nature. To 
minimize subjectivity and enhance replicability, we use an automated coding method based on a 
dictionary of uncertainty-related words and phrases. We start with the uncertainty dictionary 
from Loughran and McDonald (2011) (hereinafter LM uncertainty wordlist). Since the LM 
uncertainty wordlist is not optimized for verbal Q&A-style interactions, we supplement this list 
with a conference call-specific list of uncertainty-related words and phrases. The supplementary 
wordlist is constructed using 100 out-of-sample conference call transcripts selected at random 
over the period 2003 through 2012. Each transcript was read and questions demonstrating 
surprise, confusion, concern, lack of understanding, and significant doubt were isolated. 




commonness was defined as occurring in at least half of selected questions.
7
 Table 1 presents the 
resulting list of uncertainty-related words and phrases. The wordlist is implemented using a 
flexible search algorithm to allow for minor variation in phrase structure. For example, the 
phrase structure “is there <0:1> sense ” permits up to one intervening word that facilitates phrase 
variants including “is there sense”, “is there a sense”, “is there the sense”, “is there any sense”, 
etc. Keywords are also stemmed where appropriate to permit further variation. For example, 
surpris* allows for variants including surprise, surprised, surprising, surprisingly, etc. We 
combine the list in Table 1 with LM’s uncertainty wordlist (removing duplicates) and use a java 
script to count words and phrases by question block. Following equation (2), UNCERT
CC
 is equal 
to the number of question blocks where at least one element from the uncertainty wordlist 
occurs, scaled by the total number of question blocks in the call. 
A limitation of UNCERT
CC
 is that it does not discriminate unambiguously between 
downside risk, which is the primary focus of our analysis, and upside uncertainty. For example, 
the statements “I’m trying to figure out how much additional margin these cost savings will 
deliver” and “I’m trying to figure out how you plan to stop further margin erosion” both contain 
one of the key phrases from Table 1. The second statement, however, relates to upside 
uncertainty that is unlikely to trigger an increase in the discount rate. To produce a more refined 
measure of downside uncertainty we construct a second metric that conditions on negative tone. 
Specifically, we identify question blocks containing at least one element from both our 
uncertainty wordlist plus one negative word from LM’s (2011) negativity word dictionary. 
Following equation (2), UNCERT_NEG
CC
 is the number of negative-uncertain question blocks, 
scaled by the total number of question blocks in the call. 
                                                 
7
 We adopt a conservative approach to identifying common uncertainty-related content to minimize risk of Type I 
errors when classifying questions. A disadvantage of this approach is that it likely yields downward-biased measures 




Challenges to management are measured by the incidence of question blocks containing 
language that confronts management, criticizes (either directly or implicitly) their position, or 
queries their decisions. We use a manual coding procedure to determine whether a question 
block challenges management because although confrontation and criticism can be direct and 
explicit, it is often contextual or subtle in nature, making it hard to catch using automated 
methods. (The inter-coder concordance for our manual coding approach is 90 percent.) 
Following equation (2), CHALLENGE
CC
 is the number of question blocks classified as 
challenging or criticizing management scaled by the total number of question blocks.  
 
Empirical proxies and content analysis methods: research notes 
Research notes require a different coding approach for several reasons. First, customized 
wordlists developed for coding verbal interactions in conference calls are not applicable for 
written text. Second, multiple analysts issue research reports in response to a single earnings 
event.
8
 We therefore construct a representative measure of research note (RN) content by coding 
four reports for the q
th
 earnings announcement and using the resulting median value: 
RN_Constructk =  report n the for computed value construct kMedian thth  , (3) 




), and challenges to 
management (CHALLENGE
RN
), and n = 1… 4. 
 Manual (automated) content analysis methods are again used to construct measures of 





 comprise a two-step process. Stage one 
involves identifying text blocks relating to corporate prospects (management). A text block 
                                                 
8
 Differences in the approaches used to code research notes and conference call questions means that direct 
comparisons between analysts’ written and verbal responses should be interpreted with caution. We address this 




comprises one or more sentences, or parts thereof, on the same topic. (Text blocks are not 
required to be mutually exclusive with respect to prospects and management.) We followed the 
coding approach in Asquith et al. (2005) to identify text blocks for corporate prospects and 
management. The method involves specifying a comprehensive set of categories for each 
dimension. We use forward-looking categories from Asquith et al. (2005) as the basis for our 
prospects construct. However, since Asquith et al. (2005) code a broad sample of analyst reports, 
their category list does not capture idiosyncrasies of earnings-related research notes. We 
therefore identified a supplementary set of categories by examining 100 out-of-sample notes 
selected at random over the period 2003 through 2012. The combined list of categories used to 
identify prospects-related text blocks is presented in Table 2. 
A refined version of Asquith et al.’s (2005) template was also used as the basis for 
identifying management-focused content. Broadly, text blocks were identified as containing 
management-related commentary where the content: 
a) Referred to management directly, as indicated by terms such as “managers”, 
“management”, “CFO”, “CEO”, or to specific managers by name etc. For example: 
“Management noted they are re-evaluating prices in flagships abroad” (Abercrombie and 
Fitch 30.09.11, RBC). 
b) Contained commentary on the following aspects of firm performance considered to be 
directly under management’s control: managerial execution, strategy (including M&A, 
restructuring, advertising/marketing, and pricing, where the pricing decision has been set 
internally) and personnel changes. For example: “Amazon continues to outperform largely 
due to its focus on delivering a superior consumer experience (favorable pricing, larger 




c) Contained commentary on whether expectations have been met. For example, “What is 
clear is that Centene once again overpromised on EPS for 2007, as it did in 2006.” 
(Centene 31.12.07, Deutsche Bank). 
The specific categories used to identify management-related text blocks are presented in Table 2. 
Stage two involves classifying tone for each category in Table 2 based on the content of the 
corresponding text blocks. Three separate tonal classifications are permitted for each category: 
positive, negative and neutral. The coding method therefore allows us to capture concurrent 
instances of positive, negative and neutral tone for the same category. Consistent with Asquith et 
al. (2005), however, each category-tone combination is coded in a binary manner and as a result 
the method does not capture tone intensity (i.e., multiple text blocks with the same tenor for a 
given category). We use negative and positive keyword lists from LM (2011) and Schleicher and 
Walker (2010) as a basis for determining tone, with our manual application permitting 
contextualization and disambiguation of keywords. For example, the keyword “declining” is 
negative when used in the context of sales but is positive when used in relation to costs. A 
conservative approach to coding tone is adopted whereby the default is neutral unless a text 
block contains a statement that is unambiguously positive or negative. Our prospects 
(management challenges) metric for the n
th
 research note is the number of negatively toned 





 for the q
th
 earnings surprise as the median of the 
corresponding four report-level values. 
 Report uncertainty is coded using an automated procedure similar to that described above 
for conference calls. Specifically, we extract text from the body of the n
th
 research note (i.e., 




using a java script. Since research notes comprise formal written text, we rely exclusively on 
LM’s uncertainty dictionary.9 Report-level uncertainty is the aggregate number of uncertainty-
related words scaled by the total number of words in the report. Finally, we define UNCERT
RN
 
for earnings announcement q as the median report-level value computed using the four reports. 
 
Sample and data 
The starting point for our sampling procedure is negative quarterly earnings surprises for 
U.S. nonfinancial firms satisfying the following criteria: (a) at least four research notes issued 
within three days of quarter q earnings announcement for fiscal year t available on Investext; (b) 
at least one research note explicitly identifies the announcement as a negative surprise;
10
 (c) a 
non-negative surprise for the same firm-quarter combination is available in year t-1; (d) the 
matching non-negative quarter has at least four analyst reports issued within three days of the 
corresponding earnings announcement available on Investext; and (e) the corresponding 
conference call transcripts are available from Investext or firms investor relations web page. 
Negative surprise quarters are sampled randomly from the resulting population. We sample from 
the pre-financial crisis period (January 2004 and June 2007) and the financial crisis period 
(January 2009 and June 2012) to assess the generalizeability of our findings to variation in 
prevailing economic conditions and market sentiment.
11
 The process of coding multiple research 
notes and the conference call transcript for each earnings announcement necessarily restricts 
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 We do not condition UNCERT
RN
 on negative tone in our main tests because uncertain language is more 
unequivocally negative in written format. For example, the sentence “will revenue growth achieve target levels?” in 
a research note would imply downside uncertainty, whereas the same question posed in a Q&A setting does not 
automatically imply downside risk. In supplementary tests described below we construct a conditional measure of 
uncertainty for research notes. Results are not materially different using this metric. 
10
 An individual analyst may not view an announcement as a negative surprise (a) when the firm achieves the 
analyst’s individual forecast but misses the consensus, (b) where the street consensus differs from the IBES 
consensus, or (c) where a firm pre-announces disappointing earnings news after the last IBES consensus date.  
11
 Our sample window post-dates Regulation Fair Disclosure and rules arising from the Global Analyst Research 




sample size. We select 100 negative surprise quarters at random from each sub-period. The final 
sample therefore comprises 1,600 research notes for 200 NES-MBE matched pair quarters 
(comprising 4×200 NES-related reports plus 4×200 MBE-related reports) and 400 conference 
call transcripts (comprising 200 NES calls and 200 matched MBE calls). 
Sample firms are drawn from 45 two-digit SIC categories. Business services (SIC code 
73) has the highest representation with 25 firms (13 percent). No other sector accounts for more 
than 10 percent of the sample. The sample includes research notes published by 64 brokerage 
firms. JP Morgan has the highest number of reports at 272 (17 percent), followed by Credit 
Suisse (16 percent), Deutsche Bank (12 percent), and Morgan Stanley (11 percent). The Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation between brokerage houses in NES and MBE samples is 0.99 (0.75).  
Our sampling procedure biases toward large, established firms: the median firm has 
market capitalization of $7.4 billion and is followed by 15 analysts. The median conference call 
takes place on the same day as the earnings announcement and includes 10 equity analysts whose 
contributions are classified into 24 distinct question blocks each comprising approximately 56 
words. The median representative research note is published on the same day as the earnings 
announcement and contains 1,541 (1,507) words excluding boilerplate disclosures. Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics for firm, earnings announcement, and analyst research 
characteristics partitioned by the sign of the earnings surprise. Evidence that all pairwise 
differences for NES and MBE firm-level features are statistically indistinguishable from zero 
confirms that our matching procedure successfully controls for a range of firm-level factors that 
could influence analysts’ response to earnings news. Similarly, no difference between NES and 
MBE samples is apparent for conference call and research note characteristics. The average 




also associated with a higher likelihood of an earnings loss and lower quarterly earnings growth. 
These differences highlight the need to control for announcement-level characteristics when 
comparing analyst responses conditional on the sign of earnings news.  
 
Analysis 
 This section tests whether analysts probe cash flow prospects more thoroughly, and 
demonstrate more uncertainty and a greater propensity to challenge management when earnings 
disappoint. Table 4 presents univariate (Panel A) and multivariate (Panel B) evidence for 
performance prospects. Tables 5 and 6 report corresponding evidence for uncertainty and 
challenges to management, respectively. Univariate analyses employ paired parametric (student 
t) and nonparametric (Wilcoxon) tests. Multivariate tests control for within-subject variation in 
firm- and announcement-level characteristics not captured by our matching method. The vector 
of control variables includes: natural logarithm of market capitalisation (Log MV), an indicator 
variable for negative reported earnings (Loss); forecast dispersion (Forecastdisp) measured as 
the standard deviation of the last consensus quarterly forecast available on I/B/E/S prior to the 
corresponding quarterly earnings announcement (scaled by lagged share price); absolute 
quarterly earnings surprise (|MedianFE|) measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between IBES quarterly actual earnings and the last IBES quarterly median consensus forecast 
prior to the earnings announcement (scaled by lagged price); natural logarithm of analyst 
following (Log Analyst); indicator variables taking the value of one when the change in annual 
and seasonally-adjusted quarterly EPS are negative and zero otherwise (QEPS < 0); and the 
two-day cumulative abnormal return ending on the earnings announcement date (CAR) as a 




earnings news. Regressions are estimated using Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) with an 
exchangeable correlation structure to account for dependency among matched pairs.
12
 
 Univariate tests in Panel A of Table 4 show analysts voice relatively more concern about 
firms’ cash flow prospects following negative earnings news. In the average conference call 
following a NES, 20 percent of analyst questions refer to forward-looking weaknesses and 
threats compared with 16 percent when earnings news is neutral or positive. The 25 percent 
[(0.20 – 0.16) / 0.16] higher focus on forward-looking problems after NES is statistically and 
economically significant. Regression results reported in Panel B yield virtually identical 
conclusions. Similar findings are evident for analyst research notes. The representative research 
note published in response to non-negative earnings news contains negative-toned comments for 
15 percent of outlook categories. The comparable fraction for research notes published after NES 
is 51 percent, which equates to a 244 percent increase in forward-looking negativity. These 
conclusions are again robust to multivariate methods reported in Panel B. Collectively, findings 
presented in Table 4 for prospective analysis are consistent with equity analysts engaging in 
more rigorous information acquisition and dissemination activity when the incentives for 
attributional search and cognitive processing are particularly pronounced. 
 Table 5 documents the impact of earnings news on analyst perceptions of risk. Findings 
vary according to the type of research examined and the uncertainty metric used. Conference call 
results using UNCERT
CC
 reveal that, as expected, the majority of questions in the typical call are 
characterized by uncertain language irrespective of the sign of the earnings surprise. There is 
weak statistical evidence that average UNCERT
CC
 is incrementally higher after NES: the two-
tailed probability value for the paired t-test is borderline significant at the 0.1 level in Panel A 
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and the estimated coefficient on NES_D in Panel B is significant at the 0.09 level. However, 
univariate conclusions in Panel A are not robust to nonparametric methods and the economic 
magnitude of the difference is small (< two percent). Results for UNCERT_NEG
CC
 provide more 
robust evidence that conference call questions display heightened downside uncertainty after 
NES. Univariate tests in Panel A reveal that five percent [(0.49 – 0.465) / 0.465] more questions 
are associated with downside uncertainty in the average conference call following negative 
earnings news, and that this difference is significant at the 0.1 level or better. Regressions 
reported in Panel B yield virtually identical results. Although uncertainty-related effects are 
statistically and economically less pronounced than those reported in Table 4 for cash flow 
prospects, the conference call evidence in Table 5 is nevertheless consistent with analysts 
engaging in more rigorous information acquisition behavior following events that trigger 
attributional search and cognitive processing. Tests conducted using analyst research notes on 
the other hand, reveal no evidence of statistically higher levels of uncertainty following NES. 
The median representative research note contains only one uncertainty-related word per 1,000 
regardless of the sign of the earnings surprise. The absence of uncertainty-related content in 
response to earnings surprises generally and NES in particular is consistent with Kothari et al.’s 
(2009) evidence and suggests that rigorous information dissemination via analyst research notes 
in response to earnings news is confined to cash flow prospects. 
 Analyst objectivity is assessed by their propensity to challenge management. Results in 
Table 6 reveal analysts are more likely to challenge management when earnings disappoint. 
Univariate tests conducted using conference call data indicate that on average analysts challenge 
or criticize management in 14 percent of questions posed during calls held after negative 




results. The 51 percent [(0.142 – 0.094) / 0.094] increase in analyst willingness to confront 
management after a NES is economically and statistically significant, and supports the view that 
analysts engage in more objective information gathering behavior when doubts arise about the 
effectiveness of management control over operational and strategic aspects of the business. 
Results reported in Panel B reveal these conclusions are robust to multivariate testing methods. 
Similar findings are also apparent for published research notes. Whereas only four percent of 
management-related discussions are negatively toned in the representative report following non-
negative earnings news, the mean fraction rises to 20 percent post-NES.
13
 The 400 percent 
[(0.197 – 0.038) / 0.038] increase in unfavorable commentary demonstrates analysts’ readiness 
to challenge management in their written research outputs produced in circumstances conducive 
to attributional search. The statistical significance and economic magnitude of this increase is 
confirmed by the regressions reported in Panel B. Collectively, findings presented in Table 6 
provide robust evidence that analyst research activities display material objectivity when the 
incentives for attributional search and cognitive processing are sufficiently strong. 
 Evidence that the properties of analyst research vary according to the sign of the earnings 
surprise is consistent with social cognition theory which predicts higher (lower) levels of 
rigorous, objective analysis in response to negative (positive) schema-discrepant events.
14
 Note, 
however, that evidence consistent with rigor and objectivity is not confined exclusively to NES-
related research outputs. Results reported in Tables 4-6 demonstrate material levels of 
independent, scientific analysis in response to non-negative earnings surprises. For example, 16 
(nine) percent of questions posed by analysts during conference calls raise concern about 
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 Results for research notes display skewness: the median percent of management-related discussions that are 
negatively toned in the representative report is zero for both surprise partitions. 
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 The majority of non-negative earnings surprises are positive schema-discrepant: 93.5 percent (94 percent) of the 




prospects (challenge management) in the wake of non-negative earnings news, while 47 percent 
of questions are characterized by downside uncertainty. Similarly, the representative research 
note published in response to non-negative earnings news includes negatively-toned comments 
for 15 percent of outlook categories. These findings cast further doubt on claims that analyst 
research systematically lacks rigor and objectivity. Instead, evidence that (i) non-negative 
schema-discrepant events are associated with non-trivial levels of rigorous, objective research 
and (ii) such properties are more apparent following negative schema-discrepant news supports 
the view that equity analysts engage in meaningful financial analysis in circumstances where the 
motives for attributional search are pronounced. 
 We conducted a series of further tests to assess the robustness and generalizeability of 
findings reported in Tables 4-6. First, we used regression methods suggested by Cram et al. 
(2009) as alternatives to GEE for matched-pair data. Results and conclusions were unaffected. 
Second, we assessed the sensitivity of our results to alternative variable definitions. For the 
conference call analyses we: redefined PROSP_NEG
CC
 as forward-looking statements beyond 
the next quarter containing negative discussions of WT (rather than all forward-looking 
statements containing negative or neutral discussions of WT); developed an alternative measure 
of CHALLENGE
CC
 based on a wordlist of challenges to management constructed using a similar 
approach to that described for UNCERT; and experimented with alternative dictionaries for 
uncertainty including the LM wordlist on its own and in combination with Abraham and Cox 
(2007). With respect to analyst research notes we: replaced PROSP_NEG
RN
 with a general 
measure of negative tone defined as the number of negative words based on LM’s negativity 
dictionary scaled by the total number of negative and positive words; constructed a tone-
conditioned uncertainty measure similar to UNCERT_NEG
CC




words occurring within 5 positions of one of LM’s negative keywords scaled by the total 




 with binary 
variables equal to one where the majority of analyst reports (> two) expressed concern about 
prospects or challenged management, respectively, and zero otherwise. Conclusions based on 
these alternative variables do not differ in any material way from those reported in Tables 4-6.   
  We also examined whether results hold in different economic and financial regimes. The 
period following the financial crisis of 2008 was associated with a dramatic stock market decline 
and erosion of corporate profitability. To test whether the nature of analyst research in response 
to earnings news is conditional on underlying macroeconomic conditions, we allowed regression 
coefficients on D_NES in Tables 4-6 to vary across pre-crisis and crisis periods by extending the 
models to include the interaction D_NES×PRECRISIS, where PRECRISIS takes the value of one 
for earnings announcements from January 2004 and June 2007 and zero otherwise. The 
estimated coefficient on D_NES×PRECRISIS in all regressions is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero while the significance of coefficient estimates for the D_NES main effect is entirely 
consistent with those reported in Tables 4-6.  
 
Comparing the properties of spoken and written research 
 So far our analysis examines conference calls and research notes independently. It 
remains an open question whether the properties of attributional search vary across these 
modalities. This section compares conference calls and research notes on the basis of three 
attributional search characteristics. The first feature is directness, which reflects the level of 
candor displayed by analysts when discussing prospects and management decisions. The second 




attributional search behavior. The third feature is sensitivity, measured as the difference in 
prevalence between good and bad news events. 
 Insofar as speech is associated with more candour than text due to greater spontaneity and 
perceptions of lower permanence (Chafe and Tannen, 1987; Linell, 2005), it is possible that 
conference calls are associated with more aggressive commentary. The information gathering 
(dissemination) nature of conference calls (research notes) may also cause analysts to adopt a 
more (less) adversarial approach toward management. Conditional on analysts engaging in 
attributional search activity, one might therefore expect more directness in conference calls. 
Conversely, the personal aspect of spoken interactions may accentuate the institutional forces 
described by Fogarty and Rogers (2005), resulting in less direct attributional search behavior 
during conference calls. We examine directness by comparing qualitatively examples of 
challenges to management across the two modalities. We focus on cases where analysts 
challenge management because the level of directness and variation therein is likely to be 
particularly prominent in such circumstances. The process of identifying examples involved first 
isolating all challenges to management for each output type. All such instances were then 
reviewed and the most aggressive cases identified based on a qualitative assessment.  
Table 7 presents representative examples of the most direct challenges to management 
from our sample.
15
 Several notable findings are apparent. First, the examples provide 
unequivocal evidence of direct challenges to management decisions and firm performance by 
analysts regardless of modality:  
“…I'm a little bit more than surprised that the joint venture reached outside of the 
organization to the point where you actually went to a completely different organization 
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 Ideally we would have compared comments for the same analyst across alternative modalities. Unfortunately, this 




to recruit a CEO. And I'm at a loss as to why that was even put on the table or even 
considered. Let alone actually pulling the trigger and hiring somebody.” 
(Analyst question at conference call for Sempra Energy, 05.04.2010) 
“… I would like to understand why you’re not repurchasing shares. And if necessary I 
would like to take this to the Board level to understand that decision.”   
(Analyst question at conference call for Pulte Homes, 10.26.2004) 
“Frankly, we were disappointed and somewhat surprised by management’s 
announcement… After all, pension costs, FX and compensation expense are risks that 
should have been anticipated earlier this year.” 
(Bear Stearns research note on Goodrich Corp., 09.30.2005) 
These examples illustrate how (at least some) analysts are more than ready to confront 
management when circumstances dictate, and that such confrontations can be direct and 
uncompromising. Evidence for research notes challenges the view that analysts’ published work 
is systematically anodyne and lacking in criticality. Second, the extracts in Table 7 suggest a 
higher level of directness for analyst spoken interactions with management, as demonstrated by 
phrases such as “total breakdown”, “awfully perplexed”, “reject it out of hand”, “cannot make 
that reconcile”, “how believable is that”, “whose fault” and “confused and disappointed”. While 
research notes also contain clear (and in some cases stinging) criticism of management, the 
linguistic tone tends to be less vivid and emotive, with phrases such as “overpromised”, “not 
helped”, “scarce visibility”, “consistently underestimated”, “too aggressive”, and “penalty box” 
more the norm. These examples are consistent with speech yielding more direct evidence of 
objectivity relative to analysts’ published outputs. 
Next we test whether the prevalence of attributional search varies between conference 
calls and research notes. Our prevalence measure for research notes (conference calls) is the 




written commentary (questions to management).
16
 Since our sampling approach limits research 
reports to four per firm-announcement, we construct a comparable conference call measure 
based on questions posed by four analysts selected at random from each call. Given the weak 
findings reported above for uncertainty, evidence of attributional search behavior is defined as 
challenging management and expressing concern about performance prospects. 
We offer no directional prediction for prevalence due to potentially off-setting effects. On 
the one hand, because the same viewpoint or piece of information is often disseminated (re-
broadcast) by multiple analysts in their individual research notes, attributional search behavior 
may be evident in a high fraction of analysts’ published research outputs. In contrast, analysts are 
less likely to repeat the same question posed by one of their colleagues during a conference call 
and therefore the fraction of analysts explicitly demonstrating attributional search may appear 
lower. On the other hand, lower perceived permanence and visibility of direct spoken 
interactions relative to written commentaries could result in a higher prevalence of attributional 
search for conference call questions. 
Table 8 compares the fraction of analysts probing forward-looking weaknesses (Panel A) 
and challenging management (Panel B) in their research notes and conference call questions. 
Findings in Panel A reveal that the fraction of analysts expressing doubts over prospects in their 
research reports exceeds the comparable fraction for conference call questions, and this 
difference is apparent regardless of the sign of the earnings surprise (probability values > 0.01 
for two tailed tests). The higher prevalence of attributional search activity for research notes is 
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observed variation in relative strength will be driven by statistical biases rather than fundamentals. An alternative 
way of comparing effects is to compute standardized regression coefficients for regression models in Table 4-6. 
Unfortunately, interpreting standardized coefficients for indicator variables such as D_NES is problematic because a 




consistent with the dissemination and re-broadcasting features of written research outweighing 
the competing effects for speech.  
Findings for challenges to management reported in Panel B display a different pattern. 
Absent bad news, challenges to management are more likely in a conference call setting: the 
fraction of analysts challenging management in their research notes is zero for the median non-
negative earnings surprise compared with 17 percent in the corresponding call. Results are 
consistent with the direct, spontaneous nature of speech yielding a more powerful setting in 
which to observe analysts challenging or criticizing management when their incentives for 
attributional search are relatively weak. In contrast, the median fraction of analysts challenging 
management in response to negative news converges for written and spoken modalities at 25 
percent, while the mean prevalence of challenges is economically and statistically higher for 
research notes. Conditional on bad news, the dissemination attribute of written research appears 
to offset (or even dominate) the effects for speech. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
conclusions about the properties of analyst research may depend on a potentially complex 
interplay between the motives for cognitive processing and the type of output examined. 
The final two rows of Panels A and B in Table 8 report evidence on the sensitivity of 
attributional search behavior, measured as the change in prevalence associated with a move from 
non-negative to negative news. While the sensitivity of cognitive processing to bad news is 
statistically and economically significant for both modalities, difference-in-differences tests 
reveal that the relative increase is more pronounced for research notes (two-tailed probability 
values < 0.01). For example, the mean fraction of analysts raising doubts about prospects in 
Panel A increases by 64 percent from 0.51 after a positive surprise to 0.84 for research notes 




Similarly, Panel B reveals that analysts’ propensity to challenge management in their research 
notes increases by 178 percent [(0.34 – 0.12) / 0.12] in response to bad news, albeit from a low 
base. The comparable increase for conference calls is 42 percent.  
 Findings reported in this section suggest that conclusions about the properties of analyst 
research can vary according to the particular form of research examined. At a minimum, results 
suggest that exclusive focus on a single modality is likely to provide an incomplete picture of the 
work analysts undertake. While direct comparisons of written and spoken content raise non-
trivial research design issues, our evidence points to structural differences in the observable 
properties of analysts research that warrants further investigation.   
 
Conclusions 
Behavioral psychology demonstrates that individuals’ propensity to undertake rigorous 
analysis is contingent on the context in which their cognitive reasoning is studied. We use 
insights from the cognitive processing literature to shed new light on the properties of sell-side 
analyst research and in particular on the debate over whether their work lacks rigor and 
objectivity (Schipper, 1991; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009; Bradshaw, 2011). 
Specifically, we test whether the degree of rigor and independence varies with analyst incentives 
for attributional search, with higher levels of rigor and objectivity predicted to be more evident in 
response to negative schema-discrepant events. This conditional view of analyst research is 
evaluated against the null hypothesis that their work is characterized by an institutionalized 
structure in which symbolic displays consistently replace rigorous scientific analysis (Fogarty 
and Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). In a significant departure from prior research, we seek 
evidence on the properties of analysts’ work using published (written) research notes and direct 




Consistent with predictions, analysts are more likely to challenge management and 
explore potential weaknesses and threats relating to future performance when quarterly earnings 
fall short of expectations. Findings apply to both research notes published within three days of 
the earnings announcement and questions posed by analysts during the corresponding conference 
call. Analysts also display statistically higher levels of uncertainty in their conference call 
questions following disappointing earnings news, although economic significance is marginal. 
While negative schema-discrepant news is associated with enhanced levels of attributional 
search, non-trivial levels of rigor and objectivity are nevertheless evident in response to non-
negative schema-discrepant earnings news. Evidence that analysts challenge management and 
explore threats to future performance even when earnings news is non-negative further 
demonstrates the need to condition conclusions regarding the properties of analyst research on 
schema-discrepant events, as predicted by attribution theory. Collectively, our findings are 
inconsistent with analysts undertaking systematically bland and uncritical financial analysis due 
to the social context in which they operate. Instead, findings suggest that analysts’ innate 
cognitive processing response contradicts institutional considerations when attributional search 
incentives are strong.  
Results also suggest that structural differences in the observable aspects of analysts’ work 
with respect to format (e.g., speech versus text) and aims (e.g., information acquisition versus 
information dissemination) could affect conclusions regarding attributional search behavior. 
First, evidence that negative earnings surprises lead to enhanced attributional search as measured 
by higher levels of uncertainty is restricted to tests using conference call data. Our failure to 
document similar effects for research notes supports Kothari et al.’s (2009) conclusion that 




suggest that analyst criticism of management tends to be more blunt and outspoken in a 
conference call environment, whereas their written research tends to contain more reserved 
criticism. Analysts’ propensity to challenge management in the absence of bad news is also more 
evident during conference calls. Third, while the sensitivity of analysts’ cognitive processing 
behavior to bad news (relative to good news) is statistically and economically significant for both 
forms of research, the effect is substantially more pronounced for research notes. Our findings 
highlight the need to consider multiple modalities when assessing the properties of analysts’ 
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Table 1: Supplementary wordlist used to measure uncertainty in analysts’ conference call questions 
want to be <0:1> clear* how do you think fair to say are <0:1> seeing 
trying to figure out when do you expect apparently meaningless 
I'm <0:1> trying how do you expect I'm <0:1> curious more specific 
trying to can you <0:1> clarify just curious but 
give <0:1> a sense clarification just a curious thing yet 
get <0:2> a sense more clarity does that mean hedg* 
get a/the <0:1> sense greater clarity do you <0:1> think when was the last time 
make sense more transparency or what was the last time 
don’t have <0:2> sense greater transparency change better idea 
decipher spell out how long do you think 
could <1:1> go through is that what you’re saying probabl* bottleneck* 
want to make sure suggest possibl* help 
how should  suggesting potentially sustainab* 
how do imply maybe how much 
give <0:1> a/the feel* implying might any view 
do you <0:2> feel* is there make sure suddenly  
you suggest* it sound* risk* hesitant 
are <0:1> saying it seem* uncertain* how should <1:1> expect 
a handle it appear* perhaps    how should  <1:1> think 
should we looks like be clear issues 
should I normally unclear problems 
as <0:1> underst* in the past quantify are you saying 
what <0:1> underst* unusual* visibility competition 
make sure <0:1> underst* abnormal* what progress how long 
is that fair surpris* next steps anticipate 
does that mean shock* more specific  would you say 
wonder* how typical parameters shake out 
where are unsustain* details anticipate 
what's <0:1> happen* all of a sudden color would you say 
what might have happened is it possible range remind 
any idea it <0:1> looks cannibalize price war 
how should <1:1> look at it <0:1> seems pressure  walk <0:1> through 
how quickly I <0:1> think impair flavour / flavor 
should we <0:1> expect* I believe write-off delve 
should I <0:1> expect* seemingly write-down retention 
what happens if seems like* inventory scenario 
is there <0:1> sense sounds like capacity envis* 
is there <1:1> else do you believe different historically 
how should <0:1> look at do you think outlook moving parts 
are <0:1> assuming where do you think erratic timeframe 
fair <0:2> to assume does that mean volatil* trajectory 
did you assume does it appear expose I thought 
when do you think the impression exposure we thought 
Words and phrases are extracted from 100 out-of-sample conference call transcripts selected at random during the period 2003 
through 2012. Each transcript was read and questions demonstrating surprise, confusion, concern, lack of understanding, and 
significant doubt were isolated. Characteristic words and phrases common to these isolated questions were then identified, where 
commonness was defined as occurring in at least half of selected questions. The wordlist is implemented using a flexible search 
algorithm that stems words with numerous variants and allows for minor variation in phrase structure. Stemmed words in the 
above table are identified with an asterisk (*). Flexible phrase structures allow for variation in intermediate words and are 
represented above by the generic <x:y> structure, where x (y) is the minimum (maximum) number of intervening words 
permitted in a given phrase. We combine the above list with LM’s uncertainty wordlist (removing duplicates) and use a java 




Table 2: Categories used in manual coding of research notes to construct measures of concern 
about performance prospects and challenges to management    
Prospects  Management 
Categories Source  Categories Source 
Business outlook Asquith et al.  Management (incl. credibility) Asquith et al. 
Competitive outlook Asquith et al.  Cost cutting Asquith et al. 
Customer numbers outlook Asquith et al.  M&A Asquith et al. 
Demand outlook Supplementary  Strategy Supplementary 
Future excess capacity Supplementary  Restructuring Supplementary 
Market share Supplementary  Advertising Supplementary 
Pricing outlook Supplementary  Pricing strategy Supplementary 
Regulatory outlook Supplementary  Personnel strategy Supplementary 
Other future Supplementary  Forecast credibility Supplementary 
Debt rating
*
 Asquith et al.  Earnings targets Supplementary 
Law suits
*
 Asquith et al.  Analyst view Supplementary 
New financing
*
 Asquith et al.  Reference to “CEO”, “CFO”,   
New products Asquith et al.  “managers”, “management”, or   
Other prospective
*
 Asquith et al.  reference to named individual(s)  Supplementary 
Expense outlook Supplementary  Commentary on whether  Asquith et al. 
Cash flow outlook Supplementary  expectations have been met  
Margin outlook Supplementary    
Profitability outlook Supplementary    
Revenue outlook  Asquith et al.    
Growth prospects Asquith et al.    
Future investments Asquith et al.    
Future capx. Supplementary    
Margin expectations  Supplementary    
Valuation Supplementary    
Investment rationale  Supplementary    
Price movements Supplementary    
Future buybacks Asquith et al.    
International opportunities outlook Asquith et al.    
Earnings or revenue visibility Supplementary    
Insufficient capacity Supplementary    
Tax rate outlook Supplementary    
Recommendation Asquith et al.    
Price target Supplementary    
Industry outlook Asquith et al.    
Economic outlook Supplementary    
Forward-looking categories from Asquith et al. (2005) form the basis for coding the prospects construct, supplemented by 
categories specific to earnings-related research notes (Supplementary) identified by examining 100 out-of-sample notes selected 
at random over the period 2003 through 2012. (Categories marked with * were not part of Asquith et al.’s main coding criteria but 
were included in an additional category where the researchers collected data on whether there was additional information 
announcements relating to these specific issues occurring within + or – 4 days of the issue date of the report coded.) Categories 
used to code the challenges to management construct capture three aspects of management-related commentary: categories from 
Asquith et al. (2005) regarding aspects of firm performance considered to be directly under management’s control (Asquith et 
al.); direct references to management (Supplementary); and commentary on whether expectations have been met 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics for samples of negative and non-negative earnings quarterly earnings surprises.   
   NES      MBE    p-value for difference: 
Variable Mean St. dev Q1 Med Q3  Mean Std Q1 Med Q3  T-test Signed rank 
Firm-level characteristics               
Market capitalization ($b) 19.15 37.49 3.31 7.61 19.32  17.66 35.57 2.70 7.04 17.85  0.68 0.41 
No. analysts 16.36 6.48 11.00 15.00 20.00  15.45 6.42 11.00 14.00 18.50  0.16 0.14 
Book-to-market 1.13 1.19 0.51 0.83 1.42  1.19 1.38 0.51 0.87 1.51  0.69 0.65 
Conference calls               
No. analysts 10.55 3.358 13.00 10.00 8.00  10.450 3.639 12.00 10.00 8.00  0.65 0.43 
No. questions blocks 24.86 8.263 30.00 24.00 19.00  24.445 7.692 30.00 24.00 19.00  0.48 0.55 
Median block words 58.93 14.36 67.00 57.00 50.00  57.515 13.036 65.50 56.00 48.00  0.22 0.24 
Sum words 1599.12 566.23 1959.00 1554.00 1167.50  1542.20 533.228 1888.50 1503.00 1211.50  0.12 0.19 
Days after announcement 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.15 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.52 0.75 
Research notes               
Report length (words) 1662.08 706.546 1959.00 1541.25 1148.25  1636.19 704.69 1915.75 1507.50 1210.13  0.59 0.96 
Days after announcement 0.56 0.72 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.53 0.66 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.49 0.87 
Earnings announcements               
Earnings surprise  -0.003 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000  0.003 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003  0.01 0.01 
Abs earnings surprise 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.002  0.003 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003  0.69 0.78 
Forecast dispersion 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000  0.49 0.19 
Loss 0.115 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.060 0.238 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.01 0.02 
Earnings growth 0.590 0.493 1.000 1.000 0.000  0.255 0.437 1.000 0.000 0.000  0.01 0.01 
CAR -0.023 0.051 0.007 -0.014 -0.039  0.009 0.042 0.030 0.005 -0.015  0.01 0.01 
Abs CAR 0.037 0.042 0.010 0.022 0.050  0.030 0.031 0.009 0.020 0.043  0.07 0.27 
This table reports summary statistics for matched samples of negative quarterly earnings surprises (NES) and quarterly earnings announcements that meet or beat market 
expectations (MBE). Matching is performed by firm and fiscal quarter such that a negative surprise announced by firm i in quarter q of fiscal year t is paired with a corresponding 
MBE announced by the same firm for the same quarter in fiscal year t-1. The final sample comprises 200 quarterly NES and 200 quarterly MBE observations. For each earnings 
announcement we collect the corresponding conference call transcript and four research notes published within three days of the earnings announcement. Firm-level variables are 
defined as follows:  Market capitalisation is beginning-of-quarter price multiplied by shares outstanding; no. analysts is the number of analysts on IBES issuing at least one 
forecast during the quarter; Book-to-market is beginning-of-period book value of shareholders’ funds divided by market capitalization. Conference call variables are as follows: no. 
analysts is the number of equity analysts participating in the conference call; no, question blocks is the number of distinct lines of questioning pursued by each analysts, aggregated 
over all analysts in the call; Median block words is the number of works for the median question block in the call; Sum words is the total number of works in analysts’ questions; 
Days after announcement is the number of days by which the conference call lags the earnings announcement day. Research notes variables are defined as follows: Report length is 
the median number of words computed over the four research notes; Days after announcement is the number of days by which the conference call lags the earnings announcement 
day. Earnings announcement variables are defined as follows: Earnings surprises is the difference between unadjusted IBES actual quarterly earnings and the last unadjusted IBES 
consensus quarterly earnings forecast prior to the earnings announcement (scaled by lagged price); Abs earnings surprise is the absolute value of earnings surprise; Forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of the last consensus quarterly forecast available on IBES prior to the corresponding quarterly earnings announcement (scaled by lagged share 




share is negative and zero otherwise; CAR is the two-day cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return ending on the earnings announcement date; Abs CAR is the absolute value of 
CAR. 




Table 4: Analyst propensity to probe concerns about performance prospects 
Panel A: Univariate   
 Conference call  Representative research note 
 Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median 
NES = 0 0.161 0.093 0.159  0.148 0.174 0.083 
NES = 1 0.201 0.114 0.192  0.510 0.260 0.531 
p-value for diff. 0.001  0.001     
Panel B: Generalised estimating equations 
 Conference call  Representative research note 
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.140 (0.001)  0.111 (0.002) 
D_NES 0.034 (0.002)  0.292 (0.001) 
|Median FE| -0.023 (0.360)  0.112 (0.019) 
Forecastdisp 0.000 (0.004)  0.000 (0.542) 
Loss -0.001 (0.953)  -0.026 (0.195) 
QEPS<0 0.018 (0.120)  0.057 (0.012) 
Log Analyst 0.002 (0.055)  0.002 (0.342) 
Log MV 0.703 (0.166)  -2.854 (0.026) 
Otherinfo 0.076 (0.953)  9.786 (0.005) 
CAR -0.068 (0.585)  -1.183 (0.000) 
N 400   400  
This table reports results for univariate (Panel A) and multivariate (Panel B) tests for differences in the extent to which analysts 
explore weaknesses in firms’ performance prospects conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise. Separate results are reported 
for prospect measures derived from conference calls and research notes. The final row of Panel A reports two-tailed probability 
values related to paired T-tests (means) and paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Summary regression results in Panel B are 
estimated using Generalised Estimating Equations with an exchangeable correlation structure to account for dependency among 
matched pairs. All probability values relate to two-tailed tests. Variable definitions are as follows (see Table 3 for further 
information): D_NES is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for negative earnings surprises and zero otherwise; 
|MedianFE| is the absolute quarterly earnings surprise; Forecastdisp is the standard deviation of the last consensus quarterly 
forecast available on IBES prior to the corresponding quarterly earnings announcement (scaled by lagged share price), Loss is an 
indicator variable for negative reported earnings; QEPS<0 is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the seasonal change 
in quarterly earnings is negative and zero otherwise; Log Analysts is the natural logarithm of analysts following; Log MV is the 
natural logarithm of market capitalisation; Otherinfo is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the firms announce 
other non-earnings news concurrently with earnings; and CAR is the two-day cumulative abnormal return ending on the earnings 




Table 5: Analyst propensity to demonstrate uncertainty 
Panel A: Univariate     
 Conference call: UNCERT  Conference call: UNCERT_NEG  Representative research note 
 Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median 
NES = 0 0.848 0.097 0.860  0.465 0.128 0.454  0.001 0.001 0.001 
NES = 1 0.861 0.083 0.870  0.490 0.134 0.500  0.003 0.018 0.001 
p-value for diff 0.109  0.295  0.036  0.093  0.305  0.522 
Panel B: Generalised estimating equations 
 Conference call: UNCERT  Conference call: UNCERT_NEG  Representative research note 
 Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Intercept 0.837 (0.001)  0.427 (0.001)  0.003 (0.016) 
D_NES 0.015 (0.089)  0.027 (0.040)  0.002 (0.289) 
|Median FE| -0.001 (0.971)  0.032 (0.173)  0.000 (0.750) 
Forecastdisp 0.000 (0.005)  0.000 (0.127)  0.000 (0.278) 
Loss 0.013 (0.197)  0.001 (0.975)  -0.001 (0.314) 
QEPS<0 0.001 (0.954)  0.011 (0.354)  -0.002 (0.306) 
Log Analyst -0.001 (0.923)  -0.000 (0.774)  0.000 (0.291) 
Log MV 0.309 (0.674)  2.264 (0.014)  0.003 (0.805) 
Otherinfo 1.902 (0.151)  0.649 (0.788)  -0.036 (0.444) 
CAR 0.068 (0.458)  0.047 (0.721)  -0.008 (0.403) 
N 400   400   400  
This table reports results for univariate (Panel A) and multivariate (Panel B) tests for differences in analyst uncertainty  
conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise. Separate results are reported for uncertainty measures derived from conference 
calls and research notes. The final row of Panel A reports two-tailed probability values related to paired T-tests (means) and 
paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Summary regression results in Panel B are estimated using Generalised Estimating Equations 
with an exchangeable correlation structure to account for dependency among matched pairs. All probability values relate to two-
tailed tests. Variable definitions are as follows (see Table 3 for further information): D_NES is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one for negative earnings surprises and zero otherwise; |MedianFE| is the absolute quarterly earnings surprise; 
Forecastdisp is the standard deviation of the last consensus quarterly forecast available on IBES prior to the corresponding 
quarterly earnings announcement (scaled by lagged share price), Loss is an indicator variable for negative reported earnings; 
QEPS<0 is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the seasonal change in quarterly earnings is negative and zero 
otherwise; Log Analysts is the natural logarithm of analysts following; Log MV is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; 
Otherinfo is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the firms announce other non-earnings news concurrently with 






Table 6: Analyst propensity to challenge management 
Panel A: Univariate   
 Conference call  Representative research note 
 Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median 
NES = 0 0.094 0.091 0.071  0.038 0.127 0.000 
NES = 1 0.142 0.118 0.120  0.197 0.300 0.000 
p-value for diff 0.001  0.001     
Panel B: Generalised estimating equations 
 Conference call  Representative research note 
 Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Intercept 0.088 (0.001)  0.026 (0.470) 
D_NES 0.035 (0.001)  0.114 (0.001) 
|Median FE| 0.054 (0.057)  0.047 (0.336) 
Forecastdisp 0.000 (0.816)  0.000 (0.218) 
Loss 0.003 (0.820)  0.026 (0.281) 
QEPS<0 0.009 (0.380)  0.035 (0.132) 
Log Analyst 0.001 (0.503)  0.000 (0.830) 
Log MV 0.069 (0.960)  -3.827 (0.077) 
Otherinfo -5.658 (0.043)  5.812 (0.208) 
CAR -0.203 (0.071)  -0.821 (0.012) 
N 400   400  
This table reports results for univariate (Panel A) and multivariate (Panel B) tests for differences in analysts’ propensity to 
challenge or criticize management conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise. Separate results are reported for challenges to 
management derived from conference calls and research notes. The final row of Panel A reports two-tailed probability values 
related to paired T-tests (means) and paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Summary regression results in Panel B are estimated 
using Generalised Estimating Equations with an exchangeable correlation structure to account for dependency among matched 
pairs. All probability values relate to two-tailed tests. Variable definitions are as follows (see Table 3 for further information): 
D_NES is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for negative earnings surprises and zero otherwise; |MedianFE| is the 
absolute quarterly earnings surprise; Forecastdisp is the standard deviation of the last consensus quarterly forecast available on 
IBES prior to the corresponding quarterly earnings announcement (scaled by lagged share price), Loss is an indicator variable for 
negative reported earnings; QEPS<0 is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the seasonal change in quarterly earnings 
is negative and zero otherwise; Log Analysts is the natural logarithm of analysts following; Log MV is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation; Otherinfo is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the firms announce other non-earnings news 





Table 7: Comparison of the analyst directness when challenging management in conference call questions and research notes 
Conference call examples  Research note examples 
Let me ask I guess a high-level question about what happened in this quarter. 
There was an investor event where you seemed to signal that there was 
weakness in early May and then you went out of your way to say that things 
were fine. You reported a number that I think some would argue warranted a 
preannouncement. The issues you've pointed to seem like they shouldn't have 
been surprising. ... Many are going to say that there was a total breakdown in 
communication and that, at best, you lack visibility on your businesses. There 
has been a series of missteps here. How do investors regain confidence in this 
team and that you've finally got the outlook right? (Life Technologies 
conference call on 07.28.2011) 
 The U.K. was also a disappointment as heavy promotion for soup and beans 
was supposed to drive top line. The CEO blamed poor consumer insights by 
U.K. management in product restaging, but Joe Jiminez was supposed to be the 
rising star in management especially post the departure of Neil Harrison. And 
now the head of Asia has also left. Consistency. Management crowed about its 
success in North America, which is deserved. But as so often happens, the 
strengths HNZ has in one area are inevitably offset elsewhere. (Credit Suisse 
research note on Heinz, 01.31.2005) 
Nice results. I don't think this is going to be an unexpected question but I'm a 
little bit more than surprised that the joint venture reached outside of the 
organization to the point where you actually went to a completely different 
organization to recruit a CEO. And I'm at a loss as to why that was even put on 
the table or even considered. Let alone actually pulling the trigger and hiring 
somebody. (Sempra Energy conference call on 05.05.2009) 
 Management seems quite proud that they are gaining market share and again 
mentioned acquisitions as one of the three growth legs. However, results last 
year and in this quarter point to much more rapid deterioration in gross margin 
than they or we anticipated. For this stock to work, we believe management 
needs to convince the Street that margins can be sustained at levels that justify 
the current investment levels. This quarter did not help build the confidence to 
that goal. (Credit Suisse research note on Best Buy, 05.31.2007) 
You just didn't, you just didn't update us that you had changed it to include 
retroactivity for the 3Q also at that period, at that point.  So, this is the first time 
that I am hearing in a public forum that the low end of your guidance range 
assumed retroactivity for the 3Q. This is the first time... But you didn't tell us 
that. You did not tell us that the low end of the guidance range assumed 
retroactivity for the 3Q… I mean, as an analyst community we are trying to 
assess how you performed versus where you had thought you would perform. 
And so, I am not sure how we make that leap. (Centene Corp conference call 
on 02.08.2008) 
 What is clear is that Centene once again overpromised on EPS for 2007, as it 
did in 2006. We are concerned that the new 2008 EPS guidance could also 
prove challenging to achieve. We reduce our price target… Conference call 
provides little help in clarifying 4Q07 results and ‘08 outlook… We left the call 
with many unanswered questions on the composition of the 4Q results and the 
anticipated drivers of the 2008 EPS guidance. This was not helped by the 
company limiting the call to only 30 minutes. (Deutsche Bank research note on 
Centene Corp, 12.31.2007)  
To whom do you ascribe the blame for the disconnect. You complained earlier 
about the Street not understanding. So whose fault is that? Is that the Street's 
fault or is that a communication gap? (Cephalon conference call on  
02.15.2005) 
 Dean’s “cost savings” strategy has not worked. Dean’s strategy is to create a 
competitively advantaged cost structure that will either force smaller players to 
cede market share to Dean or exit the industry altogether. So far neither has 
happened. If the strategy does work, it will require expensive investments by 
Dean to get there with scarce visibility of how the savings drop to the bottom 
line. (Credit Suisse research note on Dean Foods Company, 09.30.2010) 
During the quarter there was some discussion that in fact the Dow had made a 
takeover bid on DuPont and I guess the question is, how did your board handle 
this? The stock obviously has not been a good performer in recent years and  
 We believe that the pressure is on the company to take active steps to create 
shareholder value in light of the underperformance of Dow’s stock under the 




Table 7 Continued 
looks like maybe you just reject it out of hand something that could have added 
a lot to shareholder value. (DuPont conference call on 07.24.2007) 
 (HSBC Global Research research note on Dow Chemical Co, 09.30.2007) 
I have to turn back to Avastin on the commercial side. I'm really just awfully 
perplexed by the answer I think to the first question regarding the sector. It was 
there were really no changes, I think you said, in the inventory channel for 
Avastin. I am just kind of looking at penetration rates here. So basically on a 
relative basis, your penetration rate in the front line grew I think around 38 
percent, and it looks like it grew around 9 percent even in the relapse setting. 
So you're looking at strong growth, especially on that front line setting, around 
38 percent, and yet you have sequential reported sales growth around 9 percent. 
I just cannot make that reconcile. (Genentech conference call on 01.10.2005) 
 
GR seemingly went out of its way to bring down the 2006 consensus estimate 
of $2.53. Rather than providing new guidance, the Company warned the 
investment community that there are a number of “uncontrollable” overhead 
related costs that could rise sharply in 2006… Frankly, we were disappointed 
and somewhat surprised by management’s announcement. On the one hand, we 
realize that GR has had an annual tendency to “reset” expectations. However, 
we were hoping management would take necessary steps to offset any looming 
headwinds. After all, pension costs, FX and compensation expense are risks 
that should have been anticipated earlier this year… Hopefully, GR will attract 
more value investors who will urge management to focus on cost reduction 
rather than an emphasis on market share. We believe this change in focus is 
imperative. (Bear Stearns research note on Goodrich Corp, 09.30.2005) 
I have to make a comment first and I will do the dirty work. Bill, a lot has 
changed since Tony left. But this kind of does bring memories of Tony back 
with this tax rate rabbit out of your hat and that’s kind of my comment… But I 
think you have to tell us when you knew this tax rate benefit was there. Was it 
in your prior guidance. Because I think to say you are on track really kind of I 
think is not really accurate. (Heinz Company conference call on 28.02.2005) 
 Despite deteriorating fundamental trends and investor scepticism, management 
still sees 2008E EPS +4.7% on implied flattish shipments. Despite clear signs 
over the past several years that the domestic business was entering the relative 
maturity stage of the corporate lifecycle, management has consistently 
underestimated the impact of both increased seasonality and cyclicality on its 
economic model. (Credit Suisse note on Harley Davidson, 12.31.2007) 
I guess I am not going to congratulate you for Las Vegas, but I guess someone 
should mention that at least you kind of figured out the problem and dealt with 
it rapidly. So I commend you for that.  The second question is – I am a little 
confused and disappointed that the share repurchase in the quarter was zero and 
we haven’t been very aggressive buying back stock… I would like to 
understand why you’re not repurchasing shares. And if necessary I would like 
to take this to the Board level to understand that decision. (Pulte Homes 
conference call on 10.26.2004) 
 We agree that CA requires dramatic change in the structure of the sales 
organization, but we can’t help but question the path chosen in this case given 
the results along with the historical record. At the same time, we can’t help but 
question the timing of this move, just before the transition of leadership to a 
new CEO, who presumably will have his or her own opinions as to the right 
direction to take. (JP Morgan research note on CA Technologies, 07.27.2012) 
Again I know you can’t detail it, but for a $36 million restructuring in Cranes to 
get $50 million that quickly, I’m just trying to get my arms around it, how 
believable is that?… And then I would also ask the second question, why didn’t 
we want to do this earlier? (Terex Corp conference call on 07.21.2011) 
 This is not the first time LIFE/IVGN miscommunicated/lacked visibility/was 
too aggressive. One quarter makes not a trend, but several quarters/years do. A 
core component of buying any stock has to be management confidence; the 
magnitude of, and explanation of this miss has to place LIFE in the penalty 
box. (Cowen research note on Life Technologies, 06.30.2011) 
This table presents examples of analyst directness, as reflected in use of vivid and uncompromising language when challenging management about firm performance and decision 
taken. The process of identifying examples of directness involved first isolating all challenges to management for each output type (conference call questions and research notes). 
All such instances were then reviewed and the most aggressive cases identified based on the authors’ qualitative assessment. 
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Table 8: Comparison of prevalence and sensitivity of analysts’ attributional search behavior in conference calls and research notes. 
Panel A: Concern about prospects             
         Differences in research notes and conference calls: 
 Representative research note  Conference calls  Average differences:  p-values for difference in: 
Earnings news category Mean St. dev Median  Mean St. dev Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
D_NES = 0 (N = 200) 0.515 0.320 0.500  0.336 0.180 0.333  0.180 0.167  0.001 0.001 
D_NES = 1 (N = 200) 0.846 0.232 1.000  0.402 0.201 0.400  0.444 0.462  0.001 0.001 
Paired difference 0.331 0.354 0.250  0.067 0.251 0.069  -0.264 -0.273    
p-value 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001    
              
Panel B: Challenges to management             
         Differences in research notes and conference calls: 
 Representative research note  Conference calls  Average differences:  p-values for difference in: 
Earnings news category Mean St. dev Median  Mean St. dev Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
D_NES = 0 (N = 200) 0.121 0.197 0.000  0.191 0.163 0.174  -0.070 -0.087  0.001 0.001 
D_NES = 1 (N = 200) 0.338 0.311 0.250  0.271 0.191 0.250  0.067 0.000  0.005 0.029 
Paired difference 0.216 0.313 0.250  0.080 0.2157 0.059  -0.137 -0.095    
p-value 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001    
This table compares the prevalence and sensitivity of analysts’ attributional search behavior for conference calls and research notes conditional on the sign of the quarterly earnings 
surprise. D_NES  = 0 is the sample of non-negative earnings surprises. D_NES  = 1 is the matched sample of negative earnings surprises. Attributional search behavior is proxied 
by concern about performance prospects (Panel A) and challenges to management (Panel B). Prevalence for research notes (conference calls) is the fraction of analysts 
demonstrating at least one instance of attributional search behavior in their written commentary (questions to management). Sensitivity is the difference in the prevalence of 
attributional search behavior between negative earnings news and non-negative earnings news. Columns headed “Differences in research notes and conference calls” report 
average paired differences between research notes and conference calls for a given sign of earnings news, and average difference-in-differences that compare the paired difference 
across news categories for research notes and conference calls. Probability values refer to parametric (t-) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed rank) tests. All probability values 
relate to two-tailed tests. 
